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Abstract
Background: Widespread availability of geographic information systems software has
facilitated the use of disease mapping in academia, government and private sector. Maps
that display the address of affected patients are often exchanged in public forums, and
published in peer-reviewed journal articles. As previously reported, a search of figure
legends in five major medical journals found 19 articles from 1994–2004 that identify
over 19,000 patient addresses. In this report, a method is presented to evaluate
whether patient privacy is being breached in the publication of low-resolution disease
maps.
Results: To demonstrate the effect, a hypothetical low-resolution map of geocoded
patient addresses was created and the accuracy with which patient addresses can be
resolved is described. Through georeferencing and unsupervised classification of the
original image, the method precisely re-identified 26% (144/550) of the patient
addresses from a presentation quality map and 79% (432/550) from a publication quality
map. For the presentation quality map, 99.8% of the addresses were within 70 meters
(approximately one city block length) of the predicted patient location, 51.6% of
addresses were identified within five buildings, 70.7% within ten buildings and 93%
within twenty buildings. For the publication quality map, all addresses were within 14
meters and 11 buildings of the predicted patient location.
Conclusion: This study demonstrates that lowering the resolution of a map displaying
geocoded patient addresses does not sufficiently protect patient addresses from re-
identification. Guidelines to protect patient privacy, including those of medical journals,
should reflect policies that ensure privacy protection when spatial data are displayed or
published.
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Background
Geocoding patient data – translating the plaintext
addresses of patients into longitudes and latitudes – has
become routine and enables display and analysis of dis-
ease patterns. Many public health surveillance systems
and academic investigations rely on specific case locations
for identifying patterns, correlates, and predictors of dis-
ease [1-3]. Maps that display such geocoded health data
are frequently presented publicly and published electron-
ically and in print.
However, publishing patient address locations on maps
also creates a risk of re-identification of individuals [4-7].
We recently reported an inadvertent breach of privacy
across five major medical journals, identifying 19 articles
from 1994–2004 that include maps with patient
addresses plotted as individual dots or symbols [4,5].
From these publications, over 19,000 patient addresses
are plotted on map figures. We demonstrated through a
process of reverse identification that the home addresses
of many of these patients could be discovered, despite the
low resolution of the disease maps.
Here, we provide the details of that method. We rely on
unsupervised classification of the spectral properties of
the map image to identify case locations. Since we do not
have available to us the original addresses of the patients
represented in the published maps, we devised an indirect
approach relying on simulation.
Methods
We sought to quantify the degree of re-identifiability of
patient home addresses from published maps. To accom-
plish this, a hypothetical low-resolution map of geocoded
patient addresses is produced and then the accuracy with
which patient addresses can be resolved (reversely identi-
fied) through a five step process is measured. First, an
original, prototypical patient map for an urban metropol-
itan area in Boston, MA was produced (Figure 1). Using
building parcel outlines for the city of Boston,[8] we gen-
erated a synthetic or hypothetical set of patient addresses
by randomly selecting buildings. Cases were assigned by a
stratified sampling design of building parcels to achieve a
distribution representative of all building and population
densities in the city. Buildings were selected with equal
spacing of 0.02 degrees. A total of 550 addresses were ran-
domly selected. Centers of the selected building were then
calculated and plotted on a county map of Boston to rep-
resent patient addresses [9]. One important issue is that
our use of the building footprint for geocoding does not
mirror the reduced accuracy obtained from geocoding
addresses. Address geocoding will have a series of associ-
ated errors that may be related to the underlying structure
of a geographic area (e.g.: road length, parcel size, housing
density)[10].
We created a JPEG image with a resolution of 50 dots per
inch (dpi), 550 × 400 pixels, a file size of 129 kb and a
scale of 1:100,000. This low resolution is typical for web
display and is lower than generally used in slide presenta-
tions. Also the re-identification of patient addresses was
evaluated using a higher-resolution map (266 dpi, 2926 ×
2261 pixels, 712 kb, 1:100,000), often the minimum res-
olution for peer-reviewed publications.
There are several steps involved in reversely identifying a
patient address. First, the sample map is scanned or
imported into GIS software as an image file [11]. Second,
the imported map is georeferenced. The cartographic pro-
jection of the map is used to set the coordinate system.
Generally, the projection of a published map would be
unknown and the correct projection would need to be
found by manually matching the image of the map to an
image of a correctly georegistered map of the same area. In
this case, we have a priori knowledge of the map projec-
tion. In either case, ground control points are selected on
the image using a corresponding vector outline of the map
area to re-project the image file of patient locations and
reference it to a coordinate system. In this example, an
outline of counties around Boston provided by the US
Census Bureau to set the ground control points [9]. The
process of scanning and georeferencing the disease map
parallels the methodology detailed by Curtis et al [7].
Third, using image analysis software [12], unsupervised
classification of the georeferenced map is performed.
Given the spectral properties of the image file, pixels are
classified so that pixels representing the patient points are
aggregated together. Fourth, a reclassified raster map (an
image composed of individual pixel elements arranged in
a grid) that only contains patient points is extracted and
converted to a vector file. Finally, Coordinates of the
patient points are then calculated.
Accuracy of reverse geocoding was measured as (a) the
number of correctly identified patient addresses (b) the
distance between the reversely identified address coordi-
nate and the boundary of the building of the patient
home address and (c) the number of buildings in which
the patient could reside, given the reversely geocoded
address. To calculate (c), we estimated the minimum
buffer size from the predicted location needed to contain
the centroid of the correct address. Accuracy in this case is
therefore defined as the number of incorrect addresses
within this buffer.
Results
Our reverse identification method correctly identified
26% (144/550) of patient addresses precisely, from a
sample map with low-resolution GIS output. We observed
increased detection with the higher-resolution publica-International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:56 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/56
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tion quality output to 79% (432/550) of patient addresses
identified exactly.
For the low resolution presentation quality map, reversely
geocoded locations were on average within 28.9 meters
(95% CI, 27.4–30.4) of the correct original address (Fig-
ure 2a). On average, correct patient address was identified
within eight buildings (95% CI, 7.0–8.3). Overall, 51.6%
of addresses were identified as being at any of five build-
ings, 70.7% at any of ten and 93% at any of 20 (Figure
2b). For the higher resolution publication quality map, all
addresses were predicted within 14 m of the correct
address. This distance is well within the footprint of most
apartment buildings and even many single family resi-
dences. While most addresses (79%) could be identified
to a single building, the maximum number of buildings in
which the patient could reside, given the reversely geoco-
ded addresses was 11 buildings.
Predictions of patient location were accurate in both
densely-populated urban settings as well as suburban
regions, as illustrated in Figure 3. Among those addresses
precisely identified, there was no observed effect of hous-
ing density on the rate of patient addresses re-identifica-
tion. However, given the variation in number of
individuals per housing unit, we expect that the anonym-
ity of patients in suburban single family houses would be
significantly reduced compared to urban areas. Locales
Prototypical patient map for Boston, Massachusetts Figure 1
Prototypical patient map for Boston, Massachusetts. The image displays 550 addresses selected by stratified random 
sampling design. The original JPEG image used in the analysis had a resolution of 50 dots per inch (550 × 400 pixels), a file size 
of 129 kb and a scale of 1:100,000. This would be a typical output for web display and usually lower resolution than would be 
shown in a slide presentation or in a peer-reviewed publication.International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:56 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/56
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with a high probability of living in large apartment build-
ings afford greater anonymity. In this study, we essentially
controlled for the variability of geocoding accuracy by
using building footprint data rather than address data.
Previous research has shown that housing density may
have substantial impact on address geocoding accuracy
[10].
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that even lowering the resolution
of a map displaying geocoded patient addresses does not
sufficiently protect patient addresses from re-identifica-
tion. Despite the low quality of output sources, these
images – based on high precision input sources – preserve
positional accuracy. Using a low quality map that would
serve the purpose of web or presentation display, we were
able to precisely identify more than one quarter of all ran-
domly selected home addresses and on average patients
could be identified to a city block or within one of eight
buildings. Using a map with minimum resolution for
peer-reviewed publication, we could identify almost all
patient addresses and on average patients could be identi-
fied within 14 m.
The ultimate accuracy of the patient re-identification will
no doubt depend on the number of individuals residing
at these addresses. In the case of multi-family apartment
dwellings, address identification may still afford a certain
level of privacy protection. In the case of single family
dwellings, re-identification becomes much more likely.
However, even in the best case scenario of an urban area
multi-family apartment building, an additional concern is
that individuals at these addresses can be fully re-identi-
fied when linked with other datasets or by using other
characteristics supplied in the publication [13]. Previous
research has shown that combinations of seemingly
innocuous data is adequate to uniquely identify individu-
als with a high level of reliability [14]. For example, an
experiment using 1990 U.S. Census summary data sur-
prised the public health community by showing that data-
sets previously thought to be adequately de-identified,
containing only 5-digit ZIP code, gender and date of birth,
could be linked with other publicly available data (e.g.,
voting records) and used to uniquely identify 87% of the
population of the United States [15]. Low-resolution
maps of patient locations pose an additional risk to indi-
vidual privacy – allowing considerably more precision in
Accuracy of reversely identifying patient location from a hypothetical low-resolution patient map in Boston, Massachusetts Figure 2
Accuracy of reversely identifying patient location from a hypothetical low-resolution patient map in Boston, 
Massachusetts. The accuracy of the reverse identification was determined by (A) the distance between the reversely identi-
fied and the original addresses and (B) the number of buildings in which the patient could reside, given the reversely geocoded 
address. The reversely geocoded location was on average within 28.9 meters (95% CI, 27.4–30.4) of the correct address. The 
mean number of buildings in which the patient might reside was 7.7 (95% CI, 7.0–8.3).International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:56 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/56
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Results of reversely identifying patient addresses in Boston, Massachusetts Figure 3
Results of reversely identifying patient addresses in Boston, Massachusetts. The green buildings are the randomly 
selected patient locations. The blue points are the predicted locations of the cases from the presentation quality map (50 dpi) 
and red points are predictions from the publication quality map (266 dpi). Proximities of the predicted to the actual location 
are displayed for both (A) a high density urban area and (B) a low density suburban area.International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:56 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/56
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re-identification than might be expected. Although the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Pri-
vacy Rule (Section 164.514) does not explicitly address
the publication of such maps, certain formats of geo-
graphic data display most likely violate the spirit of that
rule.
Curtis et al have also recently described a method to re-
identify patients from published maps through manual
outlining of case markers [7]. Though the vector-based
approach of heads-up digitizing can be more accurate
than raster-based unsupervised classification in certain
circumstances, in this case, it may be difficult to find the
true border of the case markers from a scanned paper-
based maps (such as the newspaper article described by
Curtis et al) or even low-resolution digital images. If the
marker is not digitized accurately, then it follows that the
centroid of this polygon will also less accurately reflect the
original geocoded location. Our approach differs from the
manual approach in that we rely on analyzing the spectral
properties of the map image through unsupervised classi-
fication to automatically identify patient locations. The
raster-based method based on the spectral properties of
the image can provide a reliable means of re-creating the
original vector file and systematically obtaining the center
point of a low-resolution marker. This comparison, how-
ever, warrants further evaluation. Nonetheless, the results
of the two papers are very similar in that they show that
maps containing point data are vulnerable to patient
address re-identification. These studies and our previous
publication on this topic [5] should be viewed together
informing policy around the display of geographic data.
The main question that should be asked by both authors
and editors is what are the benefits and risks of point
localization of patients? Is it necessary to publish maps of
point locations, for the presentation of relevant results of
research or are they presented merely for illustrative pur-
poses? The answer to these questions should guide deci-
sions on how to report disease maps [16]. If just for
illustrative purposes, there are techniques available to vis-
ualize spatial data without revealing patient information
[17]. For instance, a common approach to de-identifying
such data has been to use ZIP or postal code rather than
home address to protect anonymity. While usually appro-
priate for the reporting of study results, aggregation of
data to an administrative unit poses constraints on the
analysis and visualization of disease patterns [17-19].
Other approaches are available for masking geographic
data, such as spatial masking of cases by randomly relocat-
ing cases within a given distance of their true location [20-
23] or the population-density adjusted 2D Gaussian blur-
ring approach which results in only a small reduction in
sensitivity to detect clustering patterns [24]. These meth-
ods avoid these visualization constraints of data aggrega-
tion and afford sufficient privacy for publication without
substantial loss to visual display. Masking methods pro-
vide more systematic and reliable means of de-identifica-
tion rather than simply reducing map resolution. Spruill
developed a measure of privacy protection for any mask,
analogous to our measure of number of addresses within
which the patient could reside [25]. Such a measure could
be used by journal editors as a rule for not publishing
maps of individual cases unless a certain value of ano-
nymity was attained. This measure, often referred to as K-
anonymity, could help to establish guidelines for the safe
publication of disease maps [13,24].
Our approach relies on simulation, rather than attempt-
ing to re-identify patients from published maps. We chose
this approach to avoid propagating any prior inadvertent
disclosures of patient identity, and to avoid impugning
particular authors or journals. An advantage of our
approach is that since we know the value of the original
plotted location, we can precisely measure the accuracy of
re-identification. Our analysis also does not address the
geocoding method. Accuracy of re-identification will also
be dependent on the method for geocoding patient
address. Use of a global positioning system (GPS) will
provide greater accuracy then that of an address geocoder
(automatic conversion from home address text to latitude
and longitude using interpolation along street line data).
When a geocoder is applied, the input data source will
affect the accuracy of the estimate address coordinate.
Many US-based studies rely on the freely available US
Census TIGER line file as input to assign coordinates to
addresses. Although TIGER line files differ in accuracy
across the US, they rarely, if ever, approach the geometric
accuracy of GPS coordinates or even more detailed com-
mercial datasets. In fact, geocoding based on the free Cen-
sus data available to most health researchers increases
patient anonymity as the proportional placement of the
address location can greatly affect geocoding accuracy
[10,26]. Outside the US, street level data may not be avail-
able for address geocoding. Therefore, spatial analysis
studies in these areas would rely on the more accurate GPS
measures. By extension, greater positional accuracy is
revealed in these studies. Our findings may therefore be
highly pertinent for GIS-based studies in developing
countries.
The issues we raise here have, of course, much wider
implications than for just health data, including crime
data, housing data (e.g.: Section 8 units, shelters for
abused women, etc.), and other administrative data sets
[20,27,28]. New spatial data standards that protect confi-
dentiality while still effectively communicating informa-
tion about spatial patterns require immediate evaluation
[29].International Journal of Health Geographics 2006, 5:56 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/5/1/56
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Conclusion
The publication of low-resolution disease maps poses an
inherent jeopardy to patient privacy. Because the appro-
priate use of the patient address level data can bring real
benefit to many areas of public health research that deal
with spatial analysis, accidental disclosure of patient
information from such maps may lead to constraints on
obtaining geographically referenced health data. Thus,
guidelines for the display or publication of health data are
needed to guarantee privacy protection. Further, the edi-
tors of journals and textbooks should consider imple-
menting policies to ensure the safe reporting of spatial
data.
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